Vietnam: Third and Fourth Thoughts

I was brought up on the standard story: Vietnam was an unmitigated disaster. It was a war that was unwinnable and was an example of American hubris and inability of the American military to overcome an indigenous revolution. This is still the dominant narration in America; it certainly is among mainstream Democrats and the mainstream media and academics. It is likely to remain so for the foreseeable future.

Intermittently, there have been claims that the war was winnable, or even was in the process of being won. These revisionist views are based on a variety of theories, most of which I am unable to fully follow, in part, no doubt, because I have not spent much time trying to do so. Further, there is always something a bit difficult about most such counterfactual recountings of history; they tend to assume that the author can change one side of the equation and assume that the other side would not have changed. In fact, of course, a change in strategy by the US would also have provoked a change in strategy by the North Vietnamese, China, and others who had a role in the outcome of the dispute.

This brings me to the third thought, raised independently in two different articles I have read in different contexts. In a nutshell, the argument is as follows. Yes, the war in Vietnam was unwinnable. That does not mean, however, that it was a failure. Instead, the fact that the US was willing to contest in Vietnam created breathing room for other countries in Asia to develop into viable, non-Communist countries. This idea, raised by, for example, the former prime minister of Singapore, does have something to say for itself. In retrospect, the entire Cold War
was really a long-term holding action. In that context, even conflicts that ultimately resulted in losses might have had value in the same way that a fighting retreat anticipates giving ground, but making each gain costly. By the time the Vietnam War was over, the Soviet Union had already lost substantial momentum internationally and had begun to ossify and mainland China was losing some of its initial revolutionary fervor.

My fourth thought, however, is that this story still is too simple. Suppose Eisenhower had held to his original position, and given the French no support whatsoever, but had instead given some support to Ho on the condition of distance from the USSR? Or suppose Kennedy had found a way to pull the other Asian countries together without getting deeply involved? Things might have turned out as well or better at much less cost in life to both sides.

I have no answer at this point. Perhaps the only point is that the first story may not be the only story, or it may require more nuance. Only time will tell.